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While the effects of reward, affect, and motivation on learning have each developed into
their own fields of research, they largely have been investigated in isolation. As all three of
these constructs are highly related, and use similar experimental procedures, an important
advance in research would be to consider the interplay between these constructs. Here
we first define each of the three constructs, and then discuss how they may influence
each other within a common framework. Finally, we delineate several sources of evidence
supporting the framework. By considering the constructs of reward, affect, and motivation
within a single framework, we can develop a better understanding of the processes
involved in learning and how they interplay, and work toward a comprehensive theory
that encompasses reward, affect, and motivation.
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INTRODUCTION
Reward, affect, andmotivation are three highly related constructs,
but are often investigated in isolation despite using similar exper-
imental procedures. As an example, contextual fear conditioning
is a common task used to investigate affective learning in rats.
In this task, a rat is kept in a two-compartment chamber. Over
time the rat gradually learns that when a tone is presented, the
floor of one compartment of the chamber will deliver an electric
shock. With respect to the affect construct, this task is described
as eliciting a fear-related response (i.e., fleeing or freezing) when
the tone occurs. However, this procedure is nearly identical to a
conditioned place preference task, where the dependent measure
is the proportion of time that the rat spends in each compart-
ment, after the rat has been conditioned with shocks. Here the
task is described as measuring motivational effects, e.g., approach
vs. avoidance. Furthermore, it is important that an integral aspect
of the task is the use of shocks, an aversive stimulus with respect
to the reward construct, to elicit learning.
While it is possible to disentangle these constructs experi-
mentally, they often coincide in real-world experiences and can
converge and conflict in important ways. Here we briefly define
each construct and discuss how they function in concert, as
described by the proposed SIMON framework. By discussing the
interplay of the constructs, we can lay the foundation for the
development of a common theory encompassing reward, affect,
and motivation.
DEFINING THE CONSTRUCTS
Before we can discuss interactions of reward, affect, and moti-
vation, it is important to operationalize the three constructs
independently. As the descriptions below are relatively brief, it is
suggested to refer to the cited reviews for further details.
REWARD
Reward is the most clearly defined of the three constructs, par-
ticularly when viewed from an operant conditioning perspective:
an organism learns that by responding (R) to a stimulus (S), an
outcome (O) is presented. The outcome can either be appetitive
(i.e., elicit an approach response), such as food, or aversive (i.e.,
elicit avoidance), such as an electric shock. Thus, in this simplified
form, reward-based learning can be described as a S–R–O associ-
ation (i.e., operant conditioning). To clarify the reward construct,
it is important to note that while often used interchangeably,
“reward” and “reinforcement” do not have identical meanings
(White, 1989; Berridge and Robinson, 1998). Specifically, while
rewards (i.e., appetitive stimuli) elicit approach responses, rein-
forcement should be used to describe the increase of responses
to a stimulus. For further clarity, we will define “reward” as
the construct itself, where outcomes can be either “appetitive”
and “aversive,” rather refer to outcomes as being “rewarding”
(i.e., appetitive). It is also important to note that many differ-
ent types of stimuli can be appetitive, such as monetary, food,
and erotic stimuli (see Sescousse et al., 2013 for a review), while
aversive stimuli usually are either monetary losses or electric
shocks. Kirsch et al. (2004) provide a comprehensive discussion
on the role of reward-based learning (specifically, conditioning)
on cognition.
It is unarguable that rewards can vary along at least one
dimension: value; when gains vs. losses are included, this dimen-
sion is often referred to as reward valence. However, recent
findings suggest that reward is coded in the brain along two
orthogonal dimensions: valence and salience (Figure 1A). Briefly,
reward valence ranges from appetitive to aversive. Reward salience
is defined by a quadratic relationship relative to value, such
that the highest and lowest values experienced are highest
in salience. Evidence for separable coding of reward salience
is mainly supported by neural activations that correlate with
the magnitude of outcomes, independent of the valence (Zink
et al., 2004; Jensen et al., 2007; Cooper and Knutson, 2008;
Litt et al., 2011). Recent behavioral studies have supported
the notion of reward salience, even when the range of experi-
enced outcomes is constrained to only the gain or loss domain
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FIGURE 1 | Illustrations of the dimensionality of each of the three
constructs. (A) Reward: the solid line denotes that reward salience has a
quadratic relationship relative to reward valence. Recent results have also
shown that this relationship can be observed even when the range of
values experienced is constrained to either the gain or loss domain, as in
the dashed line. (B) Affect: each dot represents a word from a large
normative database Warriner et al. (2013). Dot color varies between
blue–yellow (based on arousal) and red–green (based on valence), with
variability in luminance added to improve item discriminability. The solid line
represents a quadratic model fit to all words in the database. (C)
Motivation: approach–avoidance tendencies are context-dependant, based
on not only stimulus itself, but also the current state of the individual (e.g.,
thirst, hunger) and inter-individual differences (e.g., economics status,
smoker, dieter, vegetarian). Individual preference within a given context are
denoted by the blue dots, and range from approach (dot closer to the
stimulus) to avoid (dot closer to the empty box). The orange dotted line
denotes the point of indifference.
[(Ludvig et al., 2013; Madan and Spetch, 2010); e.g., Figure 1A,
dashed line].
Neuroimaging results suggest that reward-related activations
in the medial orbitofrontal cortex, rostral anterior cingulate cor-
tex, and dorsal posterior cingulate correspond to reward value,
while activations in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and insula
correspond to reward salience (Litt et al., 2011). Activations in the
ventral striatum, and particularly the nucleus accumbens, corre-
spond to a mixture of reward value and salience, with salience
playing a stronger role. There is also evidence of dissociable brain
regions associated with gain vs. loss outcomes (Yacubian et al.,
2006; Eppinger et al., 2013).
AFFECT
Affect can be defined as the conscious experience of emotions
(Panksepp, 2000; Yik et al., 2011), though affect and emotion
are often used synonymously [also see Kleinginna and Kleinginna
(1981a), Lang (2010), and Izard (2010), for in-depth definitions
of emotion]. To describe the affective space, Russell (1980) pro-
posed the circumplex model of affect (also see Yik et al., 2011),
which suggests that affect is comprised of two orthogonal dimen-
sions: valence and arousal. Valence ranges from unpleasant to
pleasant, while arousal ranges from bored to excited. The orthog-
onality of these two dimensions is also supported by neuroimag-
ing results (Kensinger and Corkin, 2004; Posner et al., 2009):
the valence-specific network was associated with the insula, the
arousal-specific network with the medial prefrontal cortex and
posterior cingulate, while both networks included the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and the amygdala.
Within an experimental setting, words and images are used
to elicit affect within the participant, most commonly using the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008)
and Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley and
Lang, 1999; but also see Warriner et al., 2013) databases. While
affective states fill the complete circumplex space, stimuli often
show a U- or boomerang-shaped distribution [Lang et al. (1998);
e.g., Figure 1B].
MOTIVATION
Here we define motivation primarily based on the hedonistic
principle (e.g., Young, 1959; White, 1989): motivation is the
process of maximizing pleasure (i.e., appetitive, positive affect)
and minimizing pain (i.e., aversive, negative affect). The ends
of this motivational valence continuum correspomd to approach
and avoidance behavior [see (Young, 1959), Kleinginna and
Kleinginna (1981b), and Elliot and Covington (2001), for detailed
definitions of motivation]. Based on this definition, it is clear that
motivation is closely related to reward and affect. Additionally,
motivation is intrinsically defined as motor movements, to either
approach or avoid a stimulus. This perspective also overlaps
highly with the idea of motor affordances (Gibson, 1977; Cisek
and Kalaska, 2010).
It is also important to note that motivation incorporates con-
textual information that may influence stimulus processing out-
side of what could be explained by reward and affective processing
alone [e.g., Berridge (2004); see Figure 1C]. As an example,
money can be used as a appetitive outcome, but an individual’s
drive to obtain money is not always constant. A simpler example
would be one’s drive for food and water, both of which are appet-
itive, but an individual is not always hungry/thirsty and may be
over-satiated and temporarily not want to consume more food or
water, and thus be not approached. Other stimuli may be gener-
ally aversive, such as electric shocks; stimuli that reliably predict
shocks will lead to avoidance behavior after sufficient learning.
However, there are individual differences in approach–avoidance
motivation. For instance, smoking is highly aversive to many, but
considered appetitive to some. Foods like donuts and bacon can
demonstrate even more inter-individual variability: despite being
foods and thus generally appetitive, an individual who is dieting
should avoid donuts and a vegetarian would actively avoid the
bacon.
SUMMARY
Reward, affect, and motivation are related constructs. However,
all constructs are discrete and dissociable: affect is largely an inter-
nal state, whereas a reward is related an outcome to be obtained
(i.e., a goal) or avoided. While obtaining the outcome, e.g., food,
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likely also leads to a positive affective state, these are two disso-
ciable processes, such as in the case of over-satiation. The food
is still appetitive, but due to over-satiation, motivation is attenu-
ated and the resulting affective state changes accordingly. Despite
the strong intrinsic relationships between the constructs, they do
not co-vary together in all situations. Studying these instances of
disagreement are critical for the development of a comprehensive
theory that encompasses all three constructs.
THE SIMON FRAMEWORK
While prior studies have discussed portions of their interplay, all
three have not been discussed within the same framework. The
SIMON framework serves this purpose by delineating a simple
framework where the constructs are considered in concert. Here
we propose the structure of the SIMON framework and describe
prior evidence supporting portions of the framework:
The proposed SIMON framework suggests that after a
[S]timulus is presented, it leads to an [I]nternal affective state.
The stimulus and the elicited affective state both influence the
resulting [M]otivated movement (i.e., response) where the indi-
vidual responds to the stimulus. Based on the movement (or
lack there of), an [O]utcome occurs that then also leads to
an i[N]ternal affective state. See Figure 2 for a graphical rep-
resentation of the SIMON framework. Here we have the three
constructs overlaid such that the reward construct is described
by the Stimulus–Movement–Outcome (S–M–O) portion of the
framework, which is a S–R–O association, i.e., operant condi-
tioning. The affect construct is denoted by the S–I(–M) and O–N
portions of the framework, where presented stimuli, including the
outcome itself, elicit an affective state, and that this can also lead
to a response. Themotivation construct is described by the S–I–M
portion of the framework, where a stimulus and it’s resulting
affective state both lead to a motivated movement.
EVIDENCE FOR REWARD→MOTIVATION: CAN REWARD LEARNING
LEAD TO MOTIVATED MOVEMENTS?
Learning that a specific action leads to a reward-related outcome
is the basis of operant conditioning and much of animal learn-
ing as a field (e.g., Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). Additionally,
in certain circumstances, this type of learning can lead to the
FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the processes involved in the SIMON
framework. Line arrows correspond to the portions of the framework that
are intrinsic to each of the three component constructs: reward (green),
affect (pink), and motivation (blue).
development of superstitious behaviors in both human and non-
human animals (e.g., “lucky numbers”; Brown, 1986). An illus-
tration of this type of learning is outlined in (Cardinal et al.,
2002, Figure 2), where the behavior resulting from the learning
of a stimuli–outcome association are the elicitation of motivated
movements, such as lever-pressing and locomotor approach.
Consider two theoretical perspectives that bear on the relation
of these two constructs: from a reinforcement learning perspec-
tive, an agent’s goal is to obtain as much reward (i.e., appetitive
stimuli) as possible, by learning from the outcomes of prior
actions Woergoetter and Porr (2008). In other words, seeking of
rewards drives motivated movements, a notion supported by a
number of studies (e.g., Hikosaka et al., 2008), and supporting
the S–M–O portion of the SIMON framework. This rationale is
also supported by the motor chauvinist perspective: the purpose
of the brain is to produce movements, and sequences of motor
actions are constructed to achieve high-level goals, such as acquire
appetitive outcomes (Wolpert et al., 2001). Despite markedly dif-
ferent theoretical backgrounds, both perspectives suggest that at a
basic level, motor movements are important to acquiring appeti-
tive outcomes and that learning from reward-related experiences
can reinforce the production of preceding movements.
EVIDENCE FOR AFFECT→MOTIVATION: CAN AFFECT DRIVE
MOTIVATED MOVEMENTS?
Stimuli can often elicit affective states, and the combination of
the stimuli and affective states can lead to a motor response (I–M
portion of the SIMON framework). Well-known examples of
this phenomena are reflex potentiation (fight-or-flight response)
and freezing, and that affective states can influence physiological
measures such as pupil dilation, heart rate (e.g., fear brady-
cardia; Campbell et al., 1997), and skin conductance (Bradley
et al., 2008). Furthermore, research has shown that a variety of
mammals use similar facial expressions (i.e., movements of the
facial muscles) as humans to express positive/appetitive and nega-
tive/aversive states (e.g., Berridge, 2004). Lang and Bradley (2010)
discuss evidence that affective stimuli can lead to greater motor
potentiation, as measured by neural activation in supplementary
motor area, among other brain regions, indicating higher-level
cortical involvement, rather than only reflexive motor potentia-
tion due to affect. Also see Carver (2006) and Harmon-Jones et al.
(2013) for further discussions of the coupling between affect and
motivation/motor-actions.
EVIDENCE FOR REWARD→ AFFECT: CAN REWARDS LEAD TO
AFFECTIVE STATES?
Rewards and affect both have important influences on learning,
but are often discussed in isolation and use different proce-
dures: studies of reward learning usually use a conditioning-
based approach, where the task is learned through trial-and-
error with the goal of obtaining the maximal cumulative reward.
Studies using affective stimuli usually simply present the affective
words/images, though there are instances where affect is condi-
tioned (e.g., Mather and Knight, 2008; Schwarze et al., 2012).
Nonetheless, one would expect that that earning an appetitive
stimulus should elicit positive affect, whereas a negative outcome,
such as a shock, is both aversive and elicits negative affect. This
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notion also suggested by Rolls (2000), and would comprise the O–
N portion of the framework. Results from Dixon et al. (2010) also
support this idea, where physiological measures of arousal were
greater for appetitive outcomes (also see Bechara et al., 2005).
Brown (1986) also suggests that arousal can play an important
role in problem gambling.
Another line of research supporting the influence of rewards
on affect is decision affect theory (Mellers et al., 1997). Here par-
ticipants were presented with pie charts denoting probabilities of
either gaining/losing a specified amount of money or receiving an
outcome of $0. After each trial, participants were asked to pro-
vide a rating of the emotional state on a Likert scale, ranging
from extremely elated (+50) to extremely disappointed (−50),
and affective responses were found to follow directly from pre-
dictions based on the reward outcome obtained. According to
this line of research, in the event of a choice, “elation” is experi-
enced if the outcome exceeds expectations, but “disappointment”
is experienced if the outcome is worse than expected (Bell, 1985).
If feedback on the forgone/unchosen option is also presented,
“regret” is experienced if the chosen option is worse than the
unchosen option’s outcome, while “relief” is experienced when
the chosen outcome led to the better outcome (Bell, 1982; Bryne,
2002). In other words, affective responses are operationalized
based on outcomes experienced.
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE FRAMEWORK
By considering the relations between reward, affect, and moti-
vation, a myriad of behavioral findings support the notion of a
single framework. Here we outline a handful of such examples,
along with their underlying principles as outlined by the SIMON
framework.
AFFECTIVE STIMULI AND MOTOR MOVEMENTS
One of the most straightforward sources of evidence for the
SIMON framework is that positive stimuli should be more con-
gruent with an approach response, while negative stimuli should
be more congruent with an avoid response. In lexical decision,
where participants are presented with a letter-string that may or
may not be a word and must judge it’s lexicality, participants have
been shown to respond relatively faster to positive words and
relatively slower to negative words, when compared to neutral
words (Estes and Adelman, 2008). Furthermore, in a go/no-go
task, participants were slower to respond to images of fearful faces
relative to happy faces (Hare et al., 2005). In both instances, par-
ticipants exhibited a tendency to avoid negative stimuli, in conflict
with the instruct to respond (i.e., approach) the stimuli. However,
Hare et al. (2005) also reported that when participants are asked
to inhibit their responses (i.e., no-go trials), false alarm rates
are higher for happy than fearful faces as it is more difficult to
suppress the approach response to the positive stimuli. Through
similar principles, it has been suggested that approach/avoidance
movements can provide information about an animal’s affective
preferences (Kirkden and Pajor, 2006).
MOTOR MOVEMENTS AND REWARDS
Another interesting line of evidence for the SIMON framework is
intrinsic relationship between motor actions and rewards. One
example of this is motor movements should optimize rewards
earned in the task. Consider a reaching task where there are two
target areas, each associated with a different reward value, e.g.,
similar to a dartboard (see Trommershäuser et al., 2008; Cisek,
2012). Participants have been found to aim for a point that would
maximize their earnings and minimize potential losses, while also
accounting for variability in precision.
A second interaction of motor and rewards can be observed
in the influence of medication to treat motor dysfunction on
reward-related behavior. It is known that Parkinson’s patients
taking dopamine agonists are more likely to develop problem
gambling behavior (Dodd et al., 2005), a result found to gen-
eralize to other disorders also treated with dopamine agonists
(e.g., d’Orsi et al., 2011). A likely cause for this interaction is
that even though both gain outcomes andmotor movements nor-
mally rely on the phasic release of dopamine (e.g., Steinberg et al.,
2013), dopamine agonists increase the tonic level of dopamine,
still leaving a dysregulation of the dopamine system.
CONFLICT IN AFFECT AND REWARD TO IMPROVE EXECUTIVE CONTROL
Another source of support for the SIMON framework is the use of
affective stimuli that conflict with a reward. For instance, cigarette
packages in North America often depict graphical images of
the negative consequences of smoking, and have been shown to
help individuals quit smoking (Farrelly et al., 2012). Extending
this to food stimuli, Veling et al. (2011) presented participants
with palatable food images in a go/no-go task, but preceded
the food images with affective faces. Images of fearful faces
were found to increase response time, suggesting that the con-
flict between reward and affect can be used to increase impulse
control. Hollands et al. (2011) used a similar approach, but
instead conditioned individuals to form associations between
snack images and aversive bodily images (e.g., obese individ-
uals) and found that the intervention improved healthy food
choices relative to a control group. Similar interventions have
also been used to treat phobias (e.g., Hekmat and Vanian,
1971).
CONCLUSION
In the laboratory we aim to isolate a single construct and research
it experimentally. However, in the real world learning is influ-
enced by a multitude of concurrent effects that can be closely
inter-related. By considering the constructs of reward, affect, and
motivation within a single framework, we can work toward a
better understanding of the processes involved in learning and
provide an opportunity to refine the definitions of each of the
component constructs. Finally, by considering the interplay of
these three constructs, several current lines of research can be
predicted in a common framework, and we can begin to work
toward a comprehensive theory that encompasses reward, affect,
and motivation.
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